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Two former CIA officers spoke to Insider earlier than the twentieth anniversary of the US invasion of Iraq. They gave a firsthand account of the George W. Bush administration's makes an attempt to misrepresent intelligence and assert a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. Actually, the proof assembled by the CIA instructed that no such connection existed.
One in all these false connections was a supposed assembly that had occurred between Mohamed Atta, the chief 9/11 hijacker, and Iraqi intelligence brokers in Prague. In December 2001, then-Vice President Dick Cheney went on "Meet the Press" and falsely claimed that the assembly was "fairly properly confirmed." A 2003 CIA cable states that "not one" official throughout the US authorities had proof that the Prague assembly truly occurred. However, it grew to become a key a part of the administration's public case for launching the Iraq invasion on March 20, 2003, a battle that might price an estimated 300,000 lives.
The officers' mixed years of service at CIA totals as much as greater than 4 many years. Their identities are recognized to Insider, and are referred to under by pseudonyms as a result of sensitivity of their positions. Their dialogue has been edited for brevity.
Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby, and John McLaughlin didn't instantly reply to requests for remark.
Alice: No one in Washington comes out and calls Bush a liar. All people is simply too well mannered. They use another time period for what he did. However he lied. I wish to be clear about what I imply by that. He knew what he was saying was not true. He took judgements from the intelligence neighborhood that have been very unsure, judgements that we put on the market with very clear caveats — "we consider Iraq is constant its nuclear program, however we've got a low diploma of certainty, blah blah blah" — he would simply come out and state these issues as reality. He did this time and again. Similar to Cheney saying that Mohamed Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague, as a reality. When the reality was, there was quite a lot of doubt about it. It was our job at CIA to face quick, to maintain these ridiculous notions beneath management. And we tried. However there was solely a lot we may do. The White Home needed a justification for the invasion. The closest they got here was this alleged, and apparently nonexistent, assist that Iraq gave al-Qaeda [via Atta] in bringing concerning the assaults. So that they tried to hint any type of contacts between al-Qaeda and Iraq.
Bob: In the meantime, our Iraqi analysts have been saying, fairly in truth, that al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's regime have been thus far aside of their ideologies — Saddam was a pure secularist, al-Qaeda was a messianic imaginative and prescient of a caliphate and self-consciously Islamic, not less than purportedly. That's like cats and canine, you'll be able to't combine these. In fact, Saddam knew al-Qaeda was in his nation. He knew all the things that occurred in his nation. As a matter of merely staying in energy he needed to know. So it is completely pure that he would know who was al-Qaeda and what they have been as much as and that type of factor. However this was not a working relationship. It was about surveillance.
Alice: At present, individuals say that Bush was trying to justify the invasion of Iraq. He wasn't. What he was in search of is one thing totally different — promoting factors. The choice to invade had already been made, and there was not any intelligence that was going to alter their opinion. So this was not an effort to justify the battle. It was an effort to promote the battle publicly. That is an necessary distinction. The Bush administration was very specific about their Iraq obsession nearly instantly once they took energy.
US Marines topple a statue of Saddam Hussein on Baghdad in April 2003. What seemed to be a fast victory changed into a years-long quagmire by which greater than 300,000 persons are estimated to have died.
Wathiq Khuzaie/Getty
Bob: There was a gaggle of analysts who have been wanting on the hijackers. Many people have been Russia analysts — for them, the Arab subject was completely new. Fairly quickly it grew to become clear that the administration was centered on this alleged assembly between Atta and Iraqi intelligence in Prague. We could not substantiate it. The hope was expressed fairly clearly to us, early on, that we may discover one thing. The White Home was obsessive about discovering any proof in any respect.
British intelligence realized it first. They primarily mentioned, "My god, these persons are going to invade. It would not matter what we write."
Alice: Numerous that strain on the company comes down by means of the briefers. They arrive again from their conferences with the president and different senior officers, give suggestions. On a contentious situation you may go to a gathering upstairs on the seventh ground, with the briefers, the place all people is within the room. As soon as, I used to be writing a PDB [item for the President's Daily Brief] on what going into Iraq would possible do to our terrorism cooperation with allies. The message I acquired again was, the president would not wish to hear about this. Iraq was a executed deal.
Bob: They have been all saying that. I imply, the US was transferring our forces over to the Center East big-time. You are not going to waste all that gasoline and transport energy after which take heed to Saddam. British intelligence realized it first. They primarily mentioned, "My god, these persons are going to invade. It would not matter what we write. It would not matter what their very own intelligence analysts inform them concerning the penalties. They'll invade."
Alice: I bear in mind simply completely blocking this entire factor out of my thoughts. I used to be like, "No we won't probably go into Iraq as a result of that might be the worst factor we may probably do." After which someday, I spotted we have been going. It was a executed deal. It was a horrible factor. As a result of we had an actual alternative to deal a loss of life blow to al-Qaeda, or not less than get it right down to a degree the place it will be manageable. As an alternative we blew it up. We created the circumstances that led to the rise of ISIS.
Bob: CIA analysts wound up engaged on Atta for 3 years, as a result of policymakers have been so obsessive about him. My understanding is that it began with one photograph of this supposed assembly he had in Prague. We acquired it a couple of weeks after the assaults. It was actually grainy. Possibly it was him, possibly not. He wasn't solely dealing with the digital camera, and there have been different grainy figures round him. The oldsters who gave us this photograph within the first place, they lastly mentioned, "You are in search of one thing that in all probability is not there." Initially, the photograph recognition workforce had mentioned that there was a 60 p.c probability it was him. However quickly we have been speculating that they'd inflated that quantity due to a lot strain on them. And ultimately, they backed off. They mentioned they could not determine who it was.
Bob: However that did not cease the administration. They got here to CIA and mentioned, "We wish to have the ability to present that Atta was in Prague." Early on, we mentioned, "Effectively, our personal photograph recognition individuals cannot substantiate it." Afterward, as data got here dripping in from our sources and the FBI, we began having doubts that Atta had even left our nation. There was a lot proof. Reams and reams of spreadsheets. The Prague factor unraveled early on. However the obsessive questioning about Atta and Prague went on for not less than two extra years. "Discover the Iraqi angle. There's acquired to be one thing someplace. We nonetheless have not heard you completely disprove that Atta was there." We have been saying, you recognize, "we won't." Again and again. Ultimately I may reply it in my sleep. The query got here from Cheney's principals. Paul Wolfowitz. Scooter Libby. The questions have been referred to as "taskings" from these "principals." The taskings got here to us from both our department chief, or the CIA briefers who went over to the White Home. We acquired not less than ten of those taskings. They might say, "We wish to be certain that we've not missed an Iraq angle, we wish to be sure you persons are categorical on the Atta factor." That is like saying you wish to 100% show a destructive.
Bob: Then, afterward, a few of the large guys tried to push the blame down the working degree, the place the job will get executed. They'd discuss concerning the analysts' incapacity to agree on the Iraqi connection, or whether or not Atta was in Prague.
Alice: The one actual dispute was between individuals who thought we should always say there are completely no contacts between al-Qaeda and Saddam, and the individuals who mentioned there are minor contacts which can be completely not terror-related. They really introduced in a mediator. There was one man — and he was actually adamant about this — he mentioned you shouldn't say something concerning the minor contacts, as a result of it will likely be taken the unsuitable approach. He was proper. This was a minefield for us.
Then-Vice President Dick Cheney within the President's Emergency Operations Heart on September 11, 2001.
Nationwide Archives
Alice: Cheney stripped the caveats off of all the things, issues that we advised him we're unsure about, or we're fairly certain aren't true. He simply got here out and mentioned that this is true, and he additionally implied that he knew these items as a result of he had the intelligence. He implied that he had stuff that no one else may see, which was why he believed it, so he was on this place to speak about this menace that no one else had the best data on. That was a lie.
Bob: My understanding is that John McLaughlin, the CIA's deputy director, ultimately put his foot down and mentioned he'd had sufficient. He advised the White Home to cease asking.
Bob: We had this whole vault, as large as an entire room. You needed to punch a code to get in. As one in all my department chiefs mentioned, that is simply one thing to maintain sincere individuals sincere. You possibly can't have people wandering the halls, going from room to room. Contained in the vault, ground to ceiling, have been these paper printouts. All caps, you understand how these cables are. Two or three guys from my department and I have been going by means of them and highlighting each Arab identify. They'd take a stack again and the boss would say, "Oh, you probably did that quick. This is one other stack." This was an actual assembly-line operation. We stored being requested to reinvestigate. We stored listening to extremely positioned officers together with the vice chairman saying on tv that it was fairly properly confirmed the Prague assembly had occurred. Incorrect. That is a lie. You possibly can struggle to get intelligence as much as the seventh ground and out of the constructing. But when the president himself has primarily made it recognized that he would not wish to hear this, as a result of we're going into Iraq anyway, properly, good luck.
Alice: One of many issues that we had throughout this entire period [under Director George Tenet] was that CIA had such an in depth relationship with the president. So when the president is dangerous, the company is dangerous. I imply it is simply not efficient. There isn't any firewall. And I feel that analytical judgments just like the Nationwide Intelligence Estimate — they need to come out in unclassified variations with press conferences. As a result of intelligence belongs to the nation. That is been occurring a bit extra lately, with the declassified assessments in Russian interference and the origins of the coronavirus and so forth. But it surely's not sufficient. Now, I am not going to go and inform you something about sources we had, or how we acquired intelligence. However the judgments, analytical judgments primarily based on all of this data that got here out. I consider these belong to the individuals. Releasing as a lot as you'll be able to protects us. As a result of when you have got a president like Bush or Trump, all people ought to have the knowledge. When solely the president has it, we are able to get right into a state of affairs the place we won't cease a battle.
Bob: A part of what's motivating us is how drained we acquired, getting blamed for defective intelligence after we went into Iraq and located no weapons of mass destruction. That actually grates. And the general public has a really dim concept of all of this. Of our inside workings. So that is the view from the trenches. You possibly can struggle to get intelligence as much as the seventh ground and out of the constructing. But when the president himself has primarily made it recognized that he would not wish to hear this, as a result of we're going into Iraq anyway, properly, good luck. That is exhausting on the company. Folks will resign or transfer elsewhere. And people are the individuals you need within the analytic positions, the individuals who can converse fact to energy.
Ultimately you must maintain any individual accountable for what they did.
Alice: When no one is aware of what the president or vice chairman knew, or once they knew it, you get a state of affairs the place Bush can arise and say, "Effectively, there have been no WMDs, however we got false data." OK, no you were not. The ditch view isn't any you were not. You demanded defective intelligence, since you needed solely intelligence that was going to help this large extravaganza of invasion of Iraq, and you bought it.
Bob: We each nonetheless really feel type of a loyalty to CIA. We nonetheless have to clarify ourselves to individuals on the street, to our buddies. So we have this grudge in opposition to dangerous historical past as written by individuals in excessive locations that made the choices. Cheney particularly. It is flagrant. Misusing intelligence, demanding intelligence that has nothing to do with actuality. Bush and Cheney had a Nationwide Intelligence Estimate, which they ignored. It mentioned outcomes of the invasion may very well be insurgency, civil battle, in different phrases, except there's one other strongman to step in simply as dangerous as Saddam is, this place goes to disintegrate. You are going to create a monster in Iran, which goes to have — with its Shiite inhabitants — goes transfer in to Iraq.
Alice: I feel it comes right down to what you suppose Cheney believed. Do you suppose he actually believed that that assembly occurred?
Bob: Not from something we advised him. However I do not know if I can name him a liar.
Alice: I'll name him a liar. I feel he was intentionally leaving himself room to fudge. He knew he was not conveying a truthful model of the intelligence on this and different points, all the WMD points, and he was in search of a selected affect, which was promoting a battle. He knew he was misrepresenting issues. All these books cease wanting calling him a liar. They bend over backward to be honest to Cheney. No one needs to present an unvarnished opinion. Effectively, I am out of varnish. I ran out of it in 2003. Ultimately you must maintain any individual accountable for what they did. Cheney took this big tragedy of 9/11, which is simply nearly so huge which you can't specific it, and and not using a pause, cynically turned that right into a approach to promote one other battle. That was to the detriment of efforts to cease any additional assaults. It's, I feel, felony cynicism. I blame him. And I'm not going to present him wiggle room. My message was so managed for thus lengthy. I do not really feel like mincing phrases anymore.
Mattathias Schwartz is a senior correspondent at Insider and a contributing author on the New York Instances Journal. He will be reached at mschwartz@insider.com and schwartz79@protonmail.com.
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